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Introduction
The European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the European Union's core policy instrument to address greenhouse gas emission (GHG) reductions and to help fulfil the EU's Kyoto obligations (R&D spillovers and environmental externalities, see EU, 2003) . It covers energy-intensive installations from a wide range of sectors and activities and aims at a cost-minimizing reduction of their GHG emissions. It also aims at the promotion of global innovation (EU, 2007) , a goal which is shared with other emission trading schemes emerging around the world, but for which only limited empirical evidence exists. Hence, early empirical evidence on the innovation effects of the EU ETS could guide policy makers in the design of current and emerging trading schemes and regarding the role of emission trading in the overall climate policy regime. In this paper, we provide such an empirical analysis about the innovation effects of the EU ETS.
The seminal economic theory for the analysis of the innovation effects of environmental regulation is environmental economics (Jaffe et al., 2002; Requate, 2005) . Based on experiences with US trading schemes, Gagelmann and Frondel (2005) explore the potential innovation effect of the EU ETS and conclude that, in its pilot phase , it is likely to be limited. Schleich and Betz (2005) discuss which design options in the EU ETS (e.g. cap, gratis allocation rules) can be expected to be most relevant for innovation. For example, the treatment of new entrants and closures may cause distortionary investment effects (Ellermann, 2008 ). Yet, due to its recent implementation, ex-post evaluations of the actual innovation effects of the EU ETS are obviously limited (Cames, 2008) . Also, while environmental economics studies provide valuable insights into the economic incentives and disincentives generated by environmental policy instruments and their specific design, in general, they have rigid assumptions and do not look at system changes and interdependencies, although such system changes are necessary to reach long-term emission reduction goals.
Such a systemic look at innovation is at the core of the innovation system literature, which focuses on the importance of actors, networks, institutions, cumulative learning processes between users and producers, as well as the importance of spatial and technological characteristics (Edquist, 2005) . Within the innovation system literature, a variety of approaches exist that target different levels of analysis: nation states (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993) , sectors (Malerba, 2002 (Malerba, , 2004 (Malerba, , 2005 , or technologies (Carlsson et al., 2002; 2 The impact of the EU ETS on the sectoral innovation system for power generation technologies -Findings for Germany Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991) . Studies analysing energy-related innovations within the innovation system framework -a need underlined by Sagar and Holdren (2002) -typically focus on renewable and alternative power generation technologies. The innovation system approaches applied by these energyrelated studies vary, but studying the functions of emerging technological innovation systems within the technological innovation system framework has become prominent (Hekkert et al., 2007a; Hekkert et al., 2007b; Negro et al., 2007) . However, the energy-related innovation system studies typically do not analyse the specific impact of environmental regulations on the innovation system and have been criticised for not generating practical enough policy advice (Bergek et al., 2008) .
In this paper we combine these two literature streams for a more systemic evaluation of the innovation effect of the EU ETS. On the one hand, environmental economics allows a thorough understanding of the incentives generated by the trading scheme. On the other hand, we extend the scope of analysis to the innovation system thereby explicitly considering the underlying innovation processes. With this combined approach we aim to identify policy-triggered changes in the innovation system and explain how these changes came about (Walz and Schleich, 2008; Weber and Hemmelskamp, 2005) .
We limit our study to the power sector because it constitutes by far the largest share of CO 2 emissions covered by the scheme (EU, 2007) . The power sector is also the largest contributor to CO 2 emissions in the rest of the world and thus plays a key role in future innovation and emission reductions (IEA, 2008) . Our research thus analyses how the EU ETS has impacted the sectoral innovation system of power generation technologies, taking Germany as an example. We thereby provide an early systemic account of the actual innovation effects of the trading scheme from which we can derive policy recommendations.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the research case and elaborates the chosen innovation system approach. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the sectoral innovation system of power generation technologies in Germany before the EU ETS. Section 4 describes the methodology of our analysis and section 5 presents our findings on the impact of the EU ETS on the innovation system. Finally, section 6 discusses our findings and concludes with policy and research recommendations.
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Research case
In this section, we first provide some details about the EU ETS, then define the boundaries of our research case, and finally describe the specific innovation system approach chosen.
The EU ETS is a market-based climate policy instrument which went into operation in 2005. It applies directly to large emitters of greenhouse gases in all 27 EU Member States by requiring them to cover their GHG emissions with tradable EU allowances (EUA). The EU ETS is a flexible instrument rather than a command-and control regulation prescribing specific technologies or emission standards, because it is up to the individual firms how to achieve compliance (Hoffmann, 2007) . In its first two trading phases (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) allowances were predominantly allocated free-of-charge, and the rules governing this gratis allocation varied significantly among fuels, technologies and countries (Betz et al., 2006; DEHSt, 2005) . The effects of these often distortionary allocation rules on the power sector were studied mostly on an ex-ante basis (Ahman and Holmgren, 2006; Burtraw et al., 2006; Martinez and Neuhoff, 2005; Neuhoff et al., 2006) .
Four main design features of the EU ETS are relevant for the boundary setting of our analysis. First, on a sectoral level, we limit our analysis to the one sector which has the largest share of GHG emissions covered by the scheme -the power sector. Second, on a technological level, we include all power generation technologies also those not directly covered by the scheme such as renewables and nuclear because the EU ETS is characterized by technological openness. Third, on a product level, we place power generation technologies at the centre of the innovation system. This also reflects that innovation in the large capital equipment intensive power sector is -following Pavitt's (1984) taxonomysupplier-driven, i.e. by technology providers. Thus, we define 'innovation' as consisting of both 'research, development and demonstration' (RD&D) in lowcarbon power generation technologies which reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the 'adoption' of these low-carbon technologies. 1 'Adoption' includes the two innovation properties 'modernization ', i.e. technological meas-1 This simplifying distinction between development and adoption is in line with, e.g. Requate (2005) and Oltra and Saint Jean (2005) , but by no means implies a subscription to a linear innovation process model on our part.
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The impact of the EU ETS on the sectoral innovation system for power generation technologies -Findings for Germany ures to reduce the CO 2 emissions of existing plants (e.g. retrofits), and 'investment in new plants', i.e. the construction of new plants which contribute to the reduction of the sector's CO 2 emissions. Finally, at a national level, we limit this study to one country due to the national differences in allocation rules from -2012 (Matthes et al., 2005 Rogge and Linden, 2008) and the partial embeddedness of actors in national rather than European innovation system structures (Carlsson, 2006) . We choose Germany because it is the EU Member State with the largest amount of emissions covered by the EU ETS (474 Mt/a in 2005), the largest share of planned EU power generation capacity (17%) and a multitude of providers of power generation technologies (EU, 2006; Platts, 2008) .
As a consequence, we assume a sectoral perspective which enables us to study the impact of the trading scheme on all power generation technologies and thus on all technological regimes and niches relevant for the power sector. In doing so, we follow Malerba's definition of a sectoral system of innovation and production as being "composed of a set of new and established products [here: power generation technologies] for specific uses, and a set of agents carrying out activities and market and non-market interactions for the creation, production and sale of those products" (Malerba, 2004, p. 16) . As suggested by Malerba (2004), we assume a broad definition of the sector because such an aggregation level allows interdependencies, linkages and transformations to be identified within the sector of power generation technologies being impacted by the EU ETS.
Building on Malerba (2002 Malerba ( , 2004 , we search for EU ETS triggered changes in the four building blocks of the sectoral innovation system: 'knowledge and technologies', 'actors and networks', 'institutions', and 'demand'. 'Knowledge and technologies' captures that "sectoral systems differ in terms of technologies", that these "affect the nature, boundaries and organization of sectors" and that "sectors and technologies differ greatly in terms of the knowledge base and learning processes related to innovation" (Malerba, 2004, pp. 18f.) . 'Actors and networks' addresses that "a sector is composed of heterogeneous agents" (organisations and individuals) which "interact through processes of communication, exchange, cooperation, competition and command" and "are connected in various ways through market and non-market relationships" (Malerba, 2004, p. 18) . 'Institutions' includes "norms, routines, common habits, established practices, rules, laws, standards" which shape the "cognition, actions, and interactions of agents" (Malerba, 2004, p. 18) . Finally, 'demand' is "composed of heterogeneous agents the interaction of which with producers is shaped by institutions" (Malerba, 2004, p. 27) . 'Demand' "constitutes both a stimulus for innovation and a major constraint" (Malerba, 2004, p. 28) .
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In this section, we present a brief overview of the German sectoral innovation system of power generation technologies before the implementation of the EU ETS (IEA, 2007; Kaloudis and Pedersen, 2008) to provide the background for our analysis of changes caused after the incorporation of the EU ETS as a new institutional element (see generic mapping in Figure 1 ).
'Actors and Networks': As can be seen in Figure 1 , the key actor groups within the innovation system are technology providers, power generators and extraindustry research, as well as actors from the political system, the financial and services sectors and power consumers. Technological development is mainly accomplished by technology providers and their suppliers -typically aiming at the global market -and on a basic level also by extra-industry research. The four large power generators (RWE, Vattenfall, E.ON and EnBW) as well as a multitude of smaller ones (e.g. local utilities and industry) not only constitute the demand for new technologies but are also important partners of technology providers for pilot and demonstration plants (e.g. risks and costs sharing), especially for large-scale projects. Aside from such contributions to standard setting (i.e. reference plants), power generators also play a role in incremental innovations through user-producer-linkages. Apart from these activities, if RD&D departments exist, these typically focus on market research for new technologies. Private RD&D spending in both actor groups has recently recuperated from the low levels linked with liberalization and consolidation of the market. Networks take different forms, and national as well as European associations play a central role in connecting the actors, for instance through working groups, conferences and research projects. Apart from self-organised links (e.g. projectbased, formal cooperation agreements, funding of university chairs), RD&D support schemes also contribute to networks (e.g. Corretec, EU Framework Programme). Governmental actors from all levels set the framework conditions for innovation, with local agencies being especially relevant for diffusion by specifying approval conditions. Finally, international organisations such as the International Energy Agency are important players for informing the actors in the innovation system (e.g. through IEA, 2008).
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Introduction of EU ETS
Source: Adjusted and extended from Kuhlmann and Arnold (2001) 'Knowledge and Technologies': The sectoral innovation system of power generation technologies encompasses several technological innovation systems which can be broadly grouped into those for conventional, renewable and nuclear power generation technologies, with cogeneration applicable to the former two (see technological layers in Figure 1 ). Depending on the technology, the boundaries of these technological innovation systems are broader than those of the sectoral innovation system, e.g. for cogeneration, which is also used in industrial sectors. Also, the technologies in the sectoral innovation system have varying degrees of maturity, as the sectoral system not only includes established or emerging technological regimes, such as coal or wind, but also niches, such as fuel cells. (Markard and Truffer, 2008, Smith et al., 2005) . For conventional power generation technologies, an important technological trajectory concerns energy efficiency improvements driven by fuel prices. Another priority area is RD&D within emergent renewable technological regimes and niches, with the most important drivers being public support programmes and future market prospects. Centralized electricity generation and long-distance transmission constitutes the dominant sector regime, although this is increasingly being challenged by the diffusion of wind and other renewable, distributed power generation technologies. 'Demand': The market for power generation technologies is global in nature, with the German demand constituting just a small fraction of power generation capacity currently under construction worldwide and expected to be operational by 2015, only one quarter is situated in OECD countries (IEA, 2008) . In Germany, capacity was 124 GW in 2006 and 11.5 GW power plant capacity will be commissioned by 2012 (5.8 GW hard coal, 2.8 GW lignite, 2.4 GW gas, others 0.5 GW) with an additional 23 GW being planned (Matthes and Ziesing, 2008) . Approximately half the existing power plant capacities need to be replaced by 2030 (BMU and BMWT, 2006 The impact of the EU ETS on the sectoral innovation system for power generation technologies -Findings for Germany
Methodology
To map the impact of the EU ETS on the sectoral innovation system of power generation technologies we adopted an inductive approach because of the novelty of the policy instrument under study (Eisenhardt, 1989 , Yin, 2002 .
Data sampling and collection:
The empirical analysis is based on 42 interviews with German and European experts about the sectoral innovation system of power generation technologies. In order to ensure comprehensive coverage, we followed three simultaneous strategies when selecting interviewees (see Table  1 ). First, interviewees represent all the major stakeholders of the sectoral innovation system of power generation technologies (see corresponding boxes in Figure 1 ). Second, overall, interviewees cover the three categories of sectoral, technological and national experts. A third selection strategy was the even distribution of interviewees' expertise in the areas of EU ETS, the power sector and technological innovation. Our semi-structured interviews lasted between 40 minutes and 3 hours, totalling approximately 85 hours. Interview guides were adjusted for each interviewee in order to tailor the questions to the interviewee's individual area of expertise and to adopt the set of questions to findings from earlier interviews. If permitted, interviews were recorded, while in all other cases detailed notes were taken. Interviews were conducted face-to-face (with the exception of five phone interviews) and were held between December 2006 and April 2009. We deliberately chose a long time span in order to be able to better capture the dynamics in the system and identify which effects of the EU ETS were of a temporary nature and which outlasted the periodic changes in the regulatory details. In order to triangulate our findings, we analysed publicly available documents and used this documentary information to tailor our interview guides. In addition, we also conducted 15 informal talks with experts in the fields of the EU ETS, the power sector and the financial sector. These talks usually took place at climate conferences and carbon trade fairs, such as the CarbonExpo in Cologne in May 2008.
The impact of the EU ETS on the sectoral innovation system for power generation technologies -Findings for Germany 9 Data analysis: Interviews were transcribed and coded using the software Atlas.ti. The code list was initially developed based on three exemplary interviews using open coding, and then refined and reorganised during a coding test with one interview in Atlas.ti. The updated code list was tested on five more interviews from which the final code list was developed which was then used to code all the interviews (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). After coding, the cross-interview analysis was conducted by applying software-based queries on the innovation properties and the link to the EU ETS and its design features. The queries also evaluated the relevance of other policy instruments (such as international longterm climate policy, or feed-in tariffs) and additional context factors (e.g. fuel prices) as well as firm characteristics (e.g. portfolio, firm size). Queries covered all meaningful combinations of codes, and redundancies were built in so as to confirm or reject patterns in the data. The findings were cross-checked, e.g. through plausibility checks across actor groups and through comparison with the literature. Contradictory findings were subject to careful scrutiny. The explanations for these contradictions were typically found to be reasons such as regime membership (conventional vs. renewables), firm-characteristics (e.g. portfolio) or timing of the interview (e.g. changes in EU ETS) and were integrated into our results. The findings were subsequently organised according to the building blocks of the sectoral innovation system and condensed to show the major impacts of the EU ETS. Results
In this chapter we present our findings on how the EU ETS -as a new element within the building block 'institutions' -has impacted the sectoral innovation system for power generation technologies in the first years after its implementation. In doing so, we always highlight those elements within the innovation system's building blocks which are affected most by the EU ETS (for additional supporting quotes see the Annex).
.1 Impact of the EU ETS on 'knowledge and technologies'
e led to a significant scaling-up of earlier technology push efforts. Another technology provider stated that "Climate policy as a whole is the driver for CCS [..] 
but the EU ETS is what companies can feel, it brings monetary effects into businesses, goes down well with management. Ultimately, therefore, the EU ETS can be seen as the main driver. Because climate protection has been talked about for 20 to 30 years, but nothing happens in businesses as a result of soapbox oratory." In addition, the prospects of an
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Regarding the impact of the EU ETS on 'knowledge and technologies', we find that the emphasis on CO 2 -free technologies increased in four main areas. First, the EU ETS seems to have accelerated the innovation process in general and thus positively affects the rate of technological change as explained by a power generator: "There is a general acceleration effect -everything that has been done up to now needs to be done in a compressed manner." Similarly, one expert of a technology provider observed that "At the moment several technology leaps seem to be taking place simultaneously [.. ] Things used to be more sequential." This acceleration apparently affects both the diffusion of existing technologies as well as RD&D on new technologies, and is particularly relevant within the technological regime of coal-fired power plants.
Second, the most prominent effect of the EU ETS on 'knowledge and technologies' is the mainstreaming of RD&D on carbon capture and storage (CCS). As a technology provider remarked: "The impact of emission trading on R&D is visible in CCS. [..] Internally, the topic of CCS has moved from being an exotic side issue to a main focus." Clearly, CCS as a technological mitigation route has witnessed a very dynamic development over the last 5 years with the EU ETS as the main driver, even though long-term climate policy is also an important driver for carbon capture technologies. However, the operalization of long-term targets by the EU ETS appears to hav
The impact of the EU ETS on the sectoral innovation system for power generation technologies -Findings for Germany 11 extension of stringent climate policies outside Europe together with a continued lants signify a large potential market for carbon hus also driving RD&D efforts. These efforts conigher the expected long-term CO 2 price, the demand for coal-fired power p capture technologies and are t cern both components and the interplay of new processes in the overall system.
Third, the EU ETS contributes directly to energy efficiency RD&D of large fossil fuel-fired power plants because CO 2 prices represent an add-on to fuel prices. One technology provider described this supplementary nature of the EU ETS: "Efficiency was always on the agenda as optimization projects, but the EU ETS reinforces these tendencies." The h higher the incentives to further increase the efficiency level, which is especially relevant for coal-fired power plants. The strength of the impact of the EU ETS on coal is illustrated by another technology provider: "in addition to the saved fuel costs comes proportionately almost one hundred percent saved costs of CO 2 emissions as well, and that means that the optimal plant design of a coalfired plant clearly changes". The EU ETS thereby reinforces ongoing RD&D activities along the existing technological trajectory which focus on materials (e.g. 700°C power plant) and components. Because of the associated savings in fuel costs, these RD&D efforts in energy efficiency improvements are viewed as a low-risk option. Finally, losses in a plant's energy efficiency level due to CCS serve as an additional driver for increased efforts in efficiency improvements.
Fourth, the EU ETS appears to indirectly benefit RD&D on renewables. One technology provider stated that they "are carrying out more projects on renewables and new energies; [..] the EU ETS reinforces these tendencies." For the case of wind, another technology provider added "Turbine development is driven by markets and feed-in tariffs." In other words, the EU ETS complements existing favourable framework conditions for renewables, among others by increasing power prices and thus the competitiveness of renewable energy technologies. However, in itself, it does not appear to significantly affect the RD&D on renewables. Instead, public support measures such as the German feed-intariffs remain the main driver for RD&D on renewables.
Impact of the EU ETS on 'actors and networks'
In the first years after its implementation, the actors affected most by the EU ETS were corporate actors, while extra-industry research or innovation policy departments were less impacted. First, the EU ETS not only impacts power generators as actors directly subject to the regulation, but also contributes to driving technology providers' product portfolios towards technologies helping to 
Impact of the EU ETS on 'institutions'
Our interviews reveal that the impact of the EU ETS -as a new institutional element of the innovation system -on the building block 'institutions' is most nd CO 2 seriously -such as the forced shutdown of a power plant due to too high CO costs, the EUA price reaching 30 Euros, or the announcement of pronounced for corporate institutions, while other institutions so far seem to be less affected. This corporate institutional change occurs regarding the corporate CO 2 culture in general and innovation routines in particular. These changes are apparent in all power generators, while for technology providers they appear to be most pronounced for diversified system solution providers with close proximity to the regulated actors.
First, we observe a shift in corporate attitudes towards climate change. To a large degree, this change in thinking across departments can be traced back to the EU ETS, whose operationalization brought with it not only a price for CO 2 but also the awareness that policy makers might actually become more serious about tackling climate change and thus that 'business as usual' may no longer be a sustainable option. This is illustrated by one While the level and intensity of coordination of this distributed CO 2 expertise aller power generators subject to the EU ETS now perceive the scheme and how to deal with it as er a longer period of time and changes to them may be key to understanding the innovation impact of the EU ETS. One examvaries among organisations, apparently both larger and sm standard procedure, as illustrated by one power generator: "The EU ETS is now standard, but the effort for integration was considerable." This change was accomplished in an astonishingly short period of time.
Third, the incorporation of the EU ETS into business procedures includes its integration into corporate innovation routines (see Becker, 2008; Nelson and Winter, 1982) . These routines -in the sense of abstract activity patterns (Winter, 1995 
Impact of the EU ETS on 'demand'
The introduction of the EU ETS has led to a number of changes relevant for the 'demand' of power generation technologies. First, in Germany it was possible to Second, while the EU ETS incentivizes switching to fuels with lower carbon intensities and cogeneration, these incentives were often not decisive for investment decisions; other factors are more relevant. Regarding fuel switching to gas, the uniformity of allocation rules across fuels and technologies favours fuels with lower CO 2 intensities (Schleich et al., 2008) . In addition, if the uniform level of gratis allocation is high, then there is said to be an even stronger incentive to choose gas over coal. However, EUA prices would need to be much higher to overcome high gas prices and security of supply concerns, as illustrated by one power generator: "The CO 2 price would have to be 60-70 €/ t CO 2 to make gas profitable.[..] Gas is also out of the question because of the unavailability of long-term gas contracts". Regarding cogeneration: While the uncertainty associated with the continuation of beneficial cogeneration allocation rules in the EU ETS beyond 2012 appears to be detrimental to cogeneration investments, other important reasons exist for greater interest in new cogeneration power plants. These include the revised and extended cogeneration support law, indicated political commitment to an increased cogeneration share and an improvement in the public acceptance of planned new power plants. As another power generator expla and the hoped for cogeneration bonus in emission tra demand for the heat generated. 
is well known, it is only a question of whether it is profitable. [..] Emission trading has set a strong trigger to review the topics and it now appears clear that some measures have become profitable".
However, there are examples of modernization activities simply aiming to extend the lifetime of existing plants. This is the case because higher power prices and public acceptance problems for new coal-fired power plants make this an economically attractive but environmentally doubtful option to which the EU ETS indirectly contributes.
In summary, despite the EU ETS changing the framework conditions of the power sector, its impact on demand has remained limited so far as other factors have been more decisive for investment decision making. However, this situation could change with the increasing stringency and predictability of the EU ETS. One technology provider alluded to the importance of stringency: "We do think that CO 2 
will become relevant, but in the first phase it was not yet relevant, we know why... as for the second phase, let's wait and see".
The impact of the EU ETS on the sectoral innovation system for power generation technologies -Findings for Germany 19
Discussion and conclusion
This paper provides an early analysis of the impact of the EU ETS on the sectoral innovation system for power generation technologies by conducting a systemic evaluation of the innovation impact of this market-based climate policy instrument.
Regarding 'knowledge and technologies', the innovation process has accelerated in the large-scale coal power generation technological regime along the two trajectories 'energy efficiency' and 'carbon capture'. While the impact of the EU ETS on the former is of an incremental nature, the EU ETS was fundamental in establishing the new technological trajectory of CCS. As no significant developments can be observed in the emerging renewable regimes and niches triggered by the EU ETS, we argue that the scheme does not seriously challenge the current sectoral regime of large-scale centralised power generation.
Regarding 'actors and networks', we find that corporate actors embedded in the large-scale fossil-fuel based power generation technological regime, i.e. power generators and technology providers (especially large incumbents) are reacting to the EU ETS, while its influence on other actors is rather low. The main impact of the EU ETS on networks so far concerns the RD&D network for carbon capture technologies which is not only characterized by new linkages to companies from the oil and gas as well as chemical industry, but also by a particularly inw carbon sectoral innovation system for power generation technologies.
However, regarding 'demand', the direct impact of the EU ETS remains limited so far, mainly because of its lack of stringency and predictability and the relatively greater importance of other factors. Yet, the scheme indirectly contributes to an increased demand of power generators for renewable power generation technologies, particularly wind, thereby positively contributing to the developtense involvement of power generators.
Regarding 'institutions', we find that the EU ETS has led to the mainstreaming of CO 2 across organisational units, its integration into corporate routines andperhaps most importantly -a change in thinking regarding carbon constraints and top management's attention to its strategic importance. We argue that these corporate institutional changes of firms' CO 2 culture should not be overlooked as they prepare the ground for the transition to a lo Summing up, our research indicates that, on a sectoral scale, the EU ETS affects the rate and direction of the technological change of power generation technologies with the main impact within the large-scale coal power generation technological regime. The EU ETS needs to be understood as only one, albeit important, in needed to orient all the elements of the sectoral innovation system of power generation technologies along an ambitious low carbon path. For example, the impact of the EU ETS on renewables or university research has been limited so far, but feed-in-tariffs are driving the diffusion of and RD&D on renewables, while public support schemes for basic research on low-carbon technologies are promoting RD&D activities of universities and research institutes within a low carbon sectoral innovation system. Also, our interviews indicate that such a coordinated policy mix may benefit from a closer linking of environmental, en ergy and innovation policy departments so as to better align the variety of regulatory measures.
If sufficiently stringent and predictable, emission trading can be a powerful tool in the policy mix. Two design features appear important for this: the emissions cap and the mode of allocation. Regarding the former, if the expected future CO 2 price path is not sufficiently high, it will hamper both the diffusion of existing and the RD&D on new low carbon technologies. As a consequence, low CO 2 prices can be expected to be detrimenta dictability is vital, as strategic decisions, especially those regarding RD&D, seem to be driven by expectations of the ongoing long-term existence of a stringent monetary carbon constraint, not only in Europe, but also in other regions of the world. Here, the actual implementation of the EU ETS matters as this generates trust in the seriousness of policy makers about tackling climate change. Regarding the latter, our research indicates that the mode of allocation and especially expectations of future allocation rules play an important role in adoption decisions and thus care needs to be taken avoid distortions. However, factors other than the EU ETS are often more important for strategic decisions about new power plants. With the decision for full auctioning, a simple and predictable carbon signal has been given which together with more ambitious emission caps can be expected to contribute to supporting the market for low carbon technologies.
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Finally, our research has implications for the international Post-2012 climate agreement because significantly large future product markets for power generaAt a later point in time this question should then be adtion technologies are essential for low carbon innovations, and especially for RD&D activities of technology providers. A stringent and predictable climate regime implies the existence of such markets as it will need to be operationalized with demand-pull policies such as emission trading. In order to make the most of this regulatory pull effect, an international Post-2012 climate agreement should generate markets for low carbon technologies in the growth regions of the world, particularly China and India.
We envisage three areas of future research. First, since our innovation system analysis identified the relevance of corporate actors, our research should be extended by in-depth case studies of power generators and technology providers. This should examine technological and firm-level differences as these appear to have high explanatory value. Second, in order to specify the extent of the innovation effects of the EU ETS, researchers should conduct a survey of companies regulated by the EU ETS and of technology providers, ideally in several countries. dressed by econometric analyses using indicators such as patents. Third, our research indicates that the combination of the systems of innovation literature with environmental economics is a fruitful endeavour for policy evaluation studies and should also be applied to other regulations or/and other innovation system approaches.
This study is not without limitations. At the time of the interviews, the EU ETS had only been in place for a short period of time, so that our analysis can only provide an early snapshot of its impact on the sectoral innovation system and it may be worthwhile to repeat it at a later stage. As we only studied the case of Germany, although the EU ETS applies across Europe, our findings should be compared with results from other countries. Finally, our approach could be applied to other sectors covered by the EU ETS so as to highlight sector-specific differences in the impact of the EU ETS on innovation systems. In spite of these shortcomings, our analysis gives important first insights into the actual innovation effects of the EU ETS in the power sector and thus provides a valuable foundation for policy makers designing emission trading.
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Annex
The impact of the EU ETS on the sectoral innovation system for power generation technologies -Findings for Germany 29 K&T1. EUA scarcity accelerating innovation process "There is a general acceleration effect -everything that has been done up to now needs to be done in a compressed manner. If something becomes more expensive, you always need to speed up your activities". [PG] "The EU ETS acclerates investments in new and in existing plants -factor in 10 years for bringing forward investments. The reason for this are allocation shortages". [TP] "At the moment several technology leaps seem to be taking place simultaneously: 2 to 3 technology leaps in one, things used to be more sequential." [TP]
K&T2. Mainstreaming of Carbon Capture and Storage Technologies (CCS)
"The impact of emission trading on R&D is visible in CCS. [..] Internally, the topic of CCS has moved from being an exotic side issue to a main focus. It was said: CO 2 , climate change is an important subject, it's not going to go away, it needs dealing with. If you assume that fossil energies [..] will still play an important role at least for the next 30 years, then you can either say: why does the climate concern us, or one tackles the matter. [..] This means that the subject must be taken seriously and the technologies have to be developed. If you see a market for it, then that gives a considerable impetus. [..] Emission trading gave impetus to the whole affair. There was suddenly a topic in the room [CO 2 ], which did not used to be there." [TP] "The topic of CCS has developed in the last years from one for absolute nutcases into one which is totally in today. Ten years ago I was laughed at when I mentioned this possibility. "All large power plant component suppliers are active in CCS".
[TP]
"Post-combustion technology protects investments in existing plants. That's why we are conducting research in this area." [PG] "The ambition is to reduce the efficiency loss from 10% to 5-6% or less, [..] for CCS is actually counterproductive: 46% lignite, 36% after post-combustion, that doesn't make anybody really happy." [TP]
K&T3. Additional driver for higher efficiency levels (materials, components)
"Efficiency was always on the agenda as optimization projects, but the EU ETS reinforces these tendencies. For steam power plants the influence is much greater and the reason is, what was the monetary value till now of an efficiency increase in a steam-powered plant? That is essentially the discounted value of the future saving in coal, and coal is not that expensive, but coal has proportionately more carbon and thus more CO 2 emissions, which means that in addition to the saved fuel costs comes proportionately almost one hundred percent saved costs of CO 2 emissions as well, and that means that the optimal plant design of a coal-fired plant clearly changes. [..] A power station isn't designed to realize the best available technology, but the most economic technology, and at present a higher degree of efficiency is more economical.[..] There are still some incremental measures I could carry out -here we are no longer talking about the component level, but the level of the whole plant [..] -there is still some scope when designing the plant, [e.g.] another preheating stage in the steam process and slightly better cooling in the cooling tower, which all mean additional investment and improve the degree of efficiency incrementally. [..] And now it appears that there is a new optimal design with a greater efficiency. This is also reflected in what is presently being invested, in what projects are currently being discussed, not only in Germany.[..] And that is independent of how the allocation is made." [TP] "The great advantage of increasing efficiency is that R&D is also advantageous if CCS does not arrive -then the power plant with the highest efficiency is the one most likely to be approved".
K&T4. Indirectly benefiting renewables
"We are carrying out more projects on renewables and new energies; these are really future-oriented projects. The EU ETS reinforces these tendencies." [TP] "[Wind] Turbine development is driven by markets and feed-in tariffs. [..] The price for CO 2 allowances is essential, and must be guaranteed for the long term, at least 15 years, otherwise it cannot be a replacement for the feed-in tariff." [TP] "The one lives on [fossil power plants], renewables are added, [..] not because of increasing prices for coal or oil, they would have to rise much more, but because of public renewables support such as feed-in tariffs." [TP] "ETS and CDM/JI have no direct effect on our business [wind] but the long-term climate policy does: for the last 2 years there has been a veritable hype for renewables. [..] Due to the low production costs (6-7 cent /kWh) and the market price development for conventionally produced electricity, wind energy will be accepted on its own strengths -it will become interesting in any case". [TP] "Emission trading will ultimately lead to an increase in electricity prices and that leads to the situation that renewable energies, which generally have higher production costs, will become more competitive." [Association] "There is considerable dynamics in the renewables, which is simply driven -very indirectly -by the fact that states confronted with internationally legally binding CO 2 reductions are able politically to enforce production quotas. [..] my hypothesis is that the promotion of renewables is politically very stable, despite scarce funds. And that has consequences for us implicitly, that we say we have to consider where there are possibilites for us, and how does that fit in with our business, and our competences and strengths -a typical portfolio question. [..] the question of innovation can then follow [..]. [Within this] really big movement, the EU ETS is only a small impulse. Although I would claim it is no coincidence that we [perceive] a change in awareness in the discussion, also in the public one. I believe that the fact that we have a system that gives CO 2 a monetary value has a strong influence." [TP] 30
The impact of the EU ETS on the sectoral innovation system for power generation technologies -Findings for Germany "Utilities need to put pressure on technology providers to provide low carbon solutions, and utilities themselves are pressured by the carbon constraint, that is the CO 2 price." [Association] "First of all, it was very important to brief our marketing dept. because the EU ETS is nothing else for the customers than just a further planning condition .. just anothe leads to funny effects on the market, to last minute panics and that has to be grasped The absolutely essential focus is on the oil and gas firms, e s in ls, one can think relatively far if you go through it step-by-step" [TP] "In CCS a joint development is taking place between technology providers and power generators, and th tion is fundamentally different with CCS [..] Utilities want to build up skills [engin used to be very difficult, you had to beg and plead to be allowed to test a [component] in a plant, now they have understood that CCS will be imposed on them by politicians and then became very pro-active, they are suddenly very committed -e.g. at ZEP." [TP] "CCS is an exception: utilities are collaborating here with plant constructors because we are still in the pilot phase and the enterprises have different needs and are therefore pushing different technologies." [Research institute] "In the case of CO 2 capture, [the formation of partnerships] is driven by the operators' side today, because the search is on for solutions to being able to continue to produce electricity reliably, but simultaneously meeting the set environmental goals. "Actually the really big topic for us [for the product portfolio] is definitely CCS, because that really brings far-reaching change the whole plant, the components, even up to the business mode 32
The impact of the EU ETS on the sectoral innovation system for power generation technologies -Findings for Germany C1. Change in thinking, including top management involvement "The fact that emission trading has come into operation and has brought about real trading with real money, many colleagues are amazed at how it came about. [..] Many people thought that it would come to nothing, and it cannot work and so on, but it is now simply a fact and functions and is here and here to stay. And that has created a lot of confidence that we will continue to have to deal with something like this and that is influential." [TP] .
"There has already been a change in thinking caused by a real price being put on emissions, and this change in thinking should not be underestimated." [Association] "Now people are slowly realizing that if emission trading with real money is already politically feasible today, then it could actually happen that the climate change problem will be taken seriously tomorrow. is at least one person in every department dealing with CO 2 at least on a part-time basis." [..] "Twice a year a CO 2 workshop takes place which brings everyone together." [TP] "We [had to] then look and see where CO 2 occurs and if there are existing processes where we just have to integrate CO 2 in parallel: it is an issue for fuel purchasing, it was a subject for trade and it is now, with a view to innovation and technology, of course an essential contribution to investment analysis." [..] "Weekly telephone conferences are held with all the CO 2 experts in th company" [PG] "The EU ETS is now standard, but the effort for integration was considerable. [..] There is no explicit CO 2 coordinator." [PG] e "After the decision to introduce the EU ETS, the preparation [for] and actual implementation [of the EU ETS] was a high-priority topic for [us] , regarding which many, actually all business units were involved. More and more it has also been integrated in the whole generation strategy". [PG] C3. Integration into corporate innovation routines "The discussion up to now was very much related to single projects, and that of course leads to cost comparisons, the plant must be cost-effective. "Public utilities conduct sensitivity analyses with different CO 2 prices. This leads to fluctuating decisions, because many plant designers cannot bring themselves to carry out a clear profitability analysis for their project, because it does not exist" [Association] "There is a price of carbon that determines where the investment goes -and not [anymore] so much the allocation methodology because the future prospect is for auctioning". [Association] "The long-term innovation impact of the EU ETS depends on the level of trust in the continuation of the instrument. The announcements in the EU Directive [proposal] regarding CCS [..] and the acceptance of JI/CDM post 2012 were positive, even if there is no international follow-up agreement. These statements firmly establish the [innovation] road map, because it emerges from this that the EU ETS will stay, climate protection is still important -and is so for the long term." [TP] "[What matters is that] we have gained a certain degree of confidence in the fact that in the future saving CO 2 will be worth money. This is only very indirectly related with today's emissions trading. [..] Only due to the confidence that this will continue, and not only in the EU, but also because it is clear that something is being done worldwide in several places, and [..] ultimately, the fact that emission trading has really implemented the whole thing operatively and brought about real trade with real money." [TP] The impact of the EU ETS on the sectoral innovation system for power generation technologies -Findings for Germany 33 "We decided on coal for two reasons: first of all it is somewhat cheaper, and secondly without a long-term contract, the political dependency on one state is too high with gas." [PG] "The CO 2 price would have to be 60-70 €/ t CO 2 to make gas profitable.[..] Gas is also out of the question because of the unavailability of long-term gas contracts". [PG] "Due to the fact that the present allocation rules give too strong incentives for gas power stations -because no gas-fired power plant runs for 7,500 hours -the fuel mix is naturally being very strongly directed towards gas" [PG] "Naturally the choice of fuel depends heavily on whether there is a fuel-dependent benchmark or not" 
D3. New plants: coal-fired plants planned as CCS-re
"The plants are already planned to be capture-rea ady h, all the old power plants will be replaced -the new ones must however be capture-ready -that dy, so that this can be implemented later." [Association] "The new block will be CCS-ready. The planning for this started together with the first protests against the power plant [2007] . [..] The block will also be CCS-ready because CCS is already an approval condition for [another] power plant, and we are assuming that [our] approval will be exactly the same." [PG] "If the price of CO 2 is high enoug would be a boom for us. The second boom would be CCS retrofitting." [TP] 
